Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have become quite profitable recently. As the largest shareholder, the state has not asked SOEs to pay dividends in the past. Therefore, some have suggested that the state should ask SOEs to pay dividends. Indeed, the Chinese government has adopted this policy advice and started to demand back dividend payments starting from 2008. Although we do not question the soundness of the dividend policy, the point we raise is whether those profits are real if all costs owed by SOEs are properly accounted for. Among others, we are interested in investigating whether the profits of SOEs are still as large as they claim if they were to pay a market interest rate. Using a representative sample of corporate China, we find that the costs of financing for SOEs are significantly lower than for other companies after controlling for some fundamental factors for profitability and individual firm characteristics. In addition, our estimates show that if SOEs were to pay a market interest rate, their existing profits would be entirely wiped out. Our findings suggest that SOEs are still benefiting from credit subsidies, and they are not yet subject to the market interest rates. In an environment where credit rights are not fully respected, dividend policy, though important, should come second and not first.
Introduction
After many years of mounting losses, the latest data seem to indicate that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are ªnally making proªts. A World Bank (2005) study claims that SOE proªt margins increased from 2.7 percent in 1999 to 5.7 percent in 2005, and growth in industrial proªts averaged 36 percent over the same period. The study goes on to propose that the Chinese government should make an effort to cash in its dividends, which SOEs reportedly "forget" to pay out to their main shareholder. The World Bank study argues that this would be beneªcial to China's public ªnance and, more importantly, it would help rein in rapid investment growth in China by imposing more discipline on SOE managers.
These results have surprised many because the general impression has been that the majority of Chinese SOEs have low performance by international standards, as evidenced by the limited appreciation these ªrms obtain when listed in both the Hong Kong and overseas ªnancial markets (Bai, Lu, and Tao 2006; Shan 2006) . The World Bank study also appears to have ignored the fact that SOEs have not been consistent in honoring their obligations vis-à-vis bank debts, as SOE lending was perhaps the main source of non-performing loans (NPLs) at state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) (Zhou 2004) .
1 Therefore, one may question whether the proªts are as high as reported if the costs of capital (not only including paying dividends to shareholders but also market-based interest rates to creditors) are properly accounted for. In addition, there are issues as to how much dividend the SOEs would have to pay to the government and whether the dividend policy could be at the expense of the health of the banking sector as long as SOCB creditor rights are not respected. Finally, continued inferior creditor right protection could signiªcantly impair the improvement of SOCB corporate governance deriving from their diversiªed ownership, which was recently obtained with the stock exchange listings, thus leading to repeated write-offs of bad loans as experienced in some other transition economies should the economy experience a large downturn.
Indeed, before accepting the favorable interpretation put forward by the World Bank study and discussing dividend policy, one has to ask whether these SOE proªts are real. Speciªcally, two issues need to be addressed. First, even though various analyses concur that SOE proªtability has improved, the assessment is not always as rosy as in the World Bank study. OECD (2005) shows that SOE returns are signiªcantly improving: For example, on average, in 2002-03, total factor productivity increased by 5 percent, delivering a return on assets (ROA) of 10 percent, twice as large as that in 1998-99. But the report is cautious to state that large pockets of weak SOEs remain.
2 Second, another aspect deserving special attention is how bank debts are treated in calculating costs. It is well known that SOEs in China are quite reluctant to pay back their loans to SOCBs. This is because the relationship between SOEs and SOCBs was politically inºuenced and forbearance on debt has been the rule rather than the exception (Cull and Xu 2000, 2003; Brandt and Li 2003) . These considerations raise doubts on whether the proªts currently posted by China's SOEs are as high as reported or they could fade away once the generally accepted accounting principles are used.
Indeed, the preferential treatment accorded by SOCBs to SOEs can be grounded neither on SOEs' returns (which are noticeably lower than at private companies) nor on SOEs being less leveraged. Thus, it seems that SOEs do not entirely respect creditor rights.
The objective of this paper is thus twofold. First, we want to provide a careful assessment of Chinese SOEs' proªts by adjusting for realistic interest service outlays. We ªrst estimate the interest service outlays at market rates, benchmarking them also to Chinese private enterprises. We then use these estimates to impute what would be the "realistic" costs of bank debts for SOEs and compute the revised ªg-ures for proªts. The resulting adjusted proªts would provide a more credible assessment of SOE performance. As we will show, in spite of this adjustment, we still ªnd that there has been an improvement in SOE proªtability over recent years.
The second issue we address is a policy one. That is, whether China's government would be better served by encouraging SOCBs to improve their lending practices rather than just cashing in SOE proªts. As it stands-even after the successful stock exchange listings of China Construction Bank, Bank of China, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China-the government is the main shareholder at both SOEs and SOCBs. As such, the government might consider that stiffening credit policies by SOCBs may be more effective than simply cashing in SOE dividends. Indeed, as ªnance theory postulates, shareholders should be residual claimants on ªrms' proªts only after all creditors are duely paid. In other words, SOCBs have a priority claim on SOE proªts and the government could take this opportunity to encourage SOCBs to improve their credit management vis-à-vis SOEs. More importantly, by reasserting creditor rights, this would further improve the credit culture and the market economy in general in China.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 recaps the relevant literature at the heart of the debate on whether and to what extent Chinese SOEs have become proªtable. Here, we also summarize the issue of policy-inºuenced loans to induce SOCBs to keep lending on favorable terms to SOEs. Section 3 outlines the methodology we employed to build a representative sample. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical analysis by ªrst presenting some preliminary descriptive ªndings and then performing our regression analysis to come up with accurate estimates of the loan rate subsidy SOEs appear to enjoy. Section 5 computes the adjusted proªts for SOEs and shows that, after making SOEs pay loan rates on par with otherwise equivalent private enterprises, SOE proªts are entirely wiped out on the average of the reference period. Based on these calculations, Section 6 discusses policy implications and concludes.
The landscape of the Chinese corporate sector and a literature review
Since the mid 1990s, the landscape of the Chinese corporate sector has experienced signiªcant changes. From a database of ªrms with annual sales of 5 million yuan maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), we ªnd that the share of private enterprises in the total number of enterprises has increased from 6.5 to 45 percent and the share in total value-added from 2.6 to 18 percent from 1998 to 2005. The SOE share and its share in total value-added decreased rapidly, respectively, from 39.2 to 10 percent and from 57 to 37.6 percent. An OECD (2005) study shows that, according to pre-tax returns on equity (ROE), private ªrms are generally more proªtable than SOEs, although SOEs' proªtability is also on the rise. In addition, private ªrms have a lower level of indebtedness (measured as a percent of their assets) and a lower debt/equity ratio as compared to state ªrms. Nonetheless, debt/ equity ratios are decreasing for both private and state-owned enterprises.
Despite being more proªtable, private companies continue to face difªculties in their access to bank credit. According to the same OECD study, about 41 percent of private enterprises have no access to credit and 56 percent have no access to bank credit. Smaller private enterprises are even more constrained than other ªrms. For private ªrms, major hurdles are a lack of collateral and ownership discrimination. Even though their access to bank ªnancing is improving with a 67 percent increase in lending between 1998 and 2003, private companies are still ªnan-cially constrained.
Public ownership in the banking and industrial sectors appears to be one of the key factors behind the fragility of Chinese banking. Two statistics are revealing: although SOEs' contribution to the Chinese GDP was around 25 percent, they received about 65 percent of total loans. In addition, the ROA and ROE of private companies are higher than those of state enterprises (see Table 1a ).
Another aspect deserving special attention among the factors determining SOE proªts is how bank debts are treated in calculating costs. It is well known that SOEs in China are quite reluctant to pay back their loans to SOCBs. This is because the relationship between SOEs and SOCBs was politically inºuenced and forbearance on debt has been the rule rather than the exception (Cull and Xu 2000, 2003; Brandt and Li 2003; Héricourt and Poncet 2009) . These considerations raise doubts about whether the proªts currently posted by China's SOEs are as high as reported or if the proªts could fade away once the generally accepted accounting principles are used. A simple calculation using the data published by the OECD (2005) helps exemplify this point. By taking the ratio of the interest outlays to debt outstanding, we impute the implicit interest rate companies pay to creditors. Imputed interest rates on debt are signiªcantly lower for SOEs with respect to private companies and the difference does not disappear over the years (see Table 1b ).
Indeed, such preferential treatment accorded by creditors to SOEs can be grounded neither on SOEs' returns (which, as seen, are noticeably lower than at private companies) nor on SOEs being less leveraged (the debt gearing ratio measured as stock of debt over value-added is visibly larger at SOEs and the difference is, if anything, increasing; see seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that SOEs do not entirely respect creditors' rights.
These descriptive analyses are also conªrmed by more rigorous statistical analyses. Xiao (2006) , using the NBS data set of over 20,000 large and medium-sized ªrms for the period 1995-2002 and adjusting for ªrm characteristics and fundamentals, ªnds that SOEs are still much more likely to generate bad debts for the banking system than non-state enterprises despite the fact that non-performing debts in SOEs have been falling since 2000. Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006) use the same data set but a different sample period ranging from 1998-2003 to investigate whether privatization or ownership change brings about economic and social efªciency. They ªnd that ownership reform helps increase economic efªciency in those reformed ªrms. Speciªcally, Bai et al. attribute the reduction of agency costs, measured by the ratio of administrative costs, to the improvement of economic efªciency. Using a different survey data set with 12,400 ªrms in 120 Chinese cities conducted by the World Bank, Dollar and Wei (2007) also ªnd that state-owned ªrms have low marginal returns to capital relative to private and foreign ªrms. Such efªciency losses amount to 5 percent of GDP if SOEs can improve ªnancial controls and corporate governances further.
Although these existing studies shed light on SOE performance, they do not address the issue of whether the proªts of SOEs are real after other costs are accounted for, especially interest rate costs. We focus on this issue in the following sections.
Data, sampling methodology, and descriptive statistics
Our data sample is obtained from the NBS database, which contains more than 280,000 industrial ªrms with annual sales above 500 million yuan. value-added taxes, intermediate industrial input, cash ºows, debt payments, and other indicators that allow us to conduct our analysis. Given that there are some major discrepancies in certain ªnancial indicators for data before 2000, we start our data sample from 2001 to avoid such problems. In addition, given that it was impossible for us to obtain the whole database, we use a sampling methodology to construct a representative sample to reºect the NBS database.
Our sample was constructed by following two methodological rules. First, we extracted a random component designed to make a closed sample of Chinese enterprises. Second, because of a large number of ªrm drop-outs, which resulted from enterprises' birth and disappearance and/or from merger and acquisition (M&A) activity as well as statistics that were discontinued by the NBS, we superimposed the closed sample component over an open sample component. The latter component was randomly extracted.
The closed sample component was built according to the following considerations and methodology. To respect the bounds represented by the necessity to minimize costs and time, we determined the dimension of the sample (n) on the basis of the ªnancial resources of the research/project and of the tolerable error, with a conª-dence level of 95 percent. We obtained a sample composed of 5,497 units based on the following formula:
where n is the number selected for the sample size; z is a standardized variable with mean 0 and variance 1; 1 Ϫ ␣ is the degree of trust; N is the total number of units in the population to be sampled; is the allowed error size; and P is the unknown proportion, which we set at 0.5.
To select the statistical units, we used a stratiªed random sampling method that provides greater precision and gives a better representation of the original population than a simple random sample of the same size. Moreover, providing greater precision, a stratiªed sample generally requires a smaller sample size, although this advantage is achieved at the cost of more administrative and operative efforts compared to the simple random sample.
In this perspective, with reference to the 2001 data, we divided the population of 211,181 ªrms (N) into 14,250 strata, deriving from the combination of four stratiªca-tion variables that we considered the most relevant for the aims of the research. The stratiªcation variables are:
• Province (30 sub-strata);
• Ownership (5 sub-strata: SOE; cooperatives; private enterprises; enterprises with capital from Hong Kong and/or Macau and/or Taiwan; foreign-owned enterprises); • SITC Sectors (19 sub-strata); • Size of employment (5 sub-strata: 0-99 employees; 100-299 employees; 300-499 employees; 500-999 employees; 1,000 employees and above).
On the basis of these stratiªcation variables, starting from the distribution of the population of the ªrms (N), we deªned the sample design using a proportional to size allocation technique. According to this method, the frequencies of the statistical units in each stratum of the stratiªed sample are proportional to those of the stratiªed population. In other words, with proportional stratiªcation, the sample size of each stratum is proportional to the population size of the stratum and this means that each stratum has the same sampling fraction. This technique is based on the assumption that selection costs and variances are about equal across strata. 3
To overtake the practical problem of the proportional selection from the population strata containing a low number of ªrms, we introduced a cut-off value that excludes all the cells with a frequency less than 14 units (that means 0.008 percent of the population) from the selection. The allocation of the 5,497 units of the sample among the strata is shown in Tables 5 and 6 hereafter. 4 The ªnal sample (n) is formed by summing the random samples obtained from each stratum. Finally, because our research question regards the speciªcity of SOEs, we oversampled SOEs within each stratum. The open sample component was then added to the observations extracted to form the closed sample. The superimposition of this additional component should also help minimize our sampling error.
The composition of the total sample by ownership class is described in Appendix 1. The second column reports the percentage shares in the a priori base closed sample and the third column shows the shares in the a priori total sample, that is, after oversampling SOEs and after superimposing the open sample component. Columns 
Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis hinges on estimating the costs of debt for SOEs and comparing them to what we found for the other ownership classes, particularly for private enterprises. We construct two different proxies to measure the costs of debt:
where intpay it is the interest payment for ªrm i in year t; totdebt it is the total debt for ªrm i outstanding at the end of year t; and ªncost it is the total ªnancial costs for ªrm i in year t.
Even though the proxy in equation (1) is the appropriate measure of the interest rate, the proxy in equation (2) may be a better measure of the total costs of debt because it also includes non-interest costs. For our purposes, it makes sense to consider both proxies.
Before moving to the econometric analysis, we present some descriptive evidence on the two proxies and on other basic performance measures. According to our interest, all of these measures are broken down by ownership class.
Descriptive statistics
The perception that SOEs pay lower rates is conªrmed at the descriptive level. This is true irrespectively of whether we consider intrate or intrate1. The average data for intrate are reported in Table 2a , while those for intrate1 are shown in Table 2b .
With respect to intrate, SOEs paid 133 basis points less than the total sample average during the sample period from 2001-05. The SOE gap amounts to 265 basis points with respect to cooperative enterprises and 198 basis points compared to private enterprises. However, intrate for SOEs does not seem to differ signiªcantly from two other special classes of enterprises-those with ownership located in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and those with ownership located outside of greater China. Therefore, lower costs of debt for SOEs, especially with respect to private ªrms, is mostly systematic across the years.
We reach similar results after examining intrate1. With respect to the entire period, SOEs pay 157 basis points less than the average company, 225 basis points less than private enterprises, 4 basis points less than Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan companies, and 75 basis points less than foreign capital ªrms. Note that the favorable gap for SOEs does not reduce visibly over time.
The low costs of debt for SOEs seem to be neither justiªed on the grounds of better proªtability nor on the basis of lower leverage, where both variables affect the probability of default-negatively for the former and positively for the latter. The basic measure of proªtability we consider is ROA, given by the ratio of total proªts to total assets.
From 
Note: Interest rates are calculated as the ratio of ªnance costs in the year to total debts outstanding at the end of the year.
We excluded outlying ªrms with negative ªnance costs or with intrate1 100%.
reached by private ªrms (9.23 percent and increasing between the two sub-periods) and cooperative enterprises (10.88 percent), to the intermediate values for Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan companies (3.70 percent and slightly decreasing between the two sub-periods) and foreign capital ªrms (5.82 percent and stable), to the minimum of SOEs, which record persistently negative levels (Ϫ1.23 percent for the entire period, worsening from Ϫ1.05 to Ϫ1.54 percent across the two sub-periods). Nevertheless, judging the SOE sector performance on this per capita level would be misleading if, as it happens, the improvement in performance is achieved mostly by the larger SOEs.
To be sure, we should remark that if we use a weighted average, the ROA for SOEs is no longer negative: It is 0.92 percent over 2001-05 and, even though remaining well below those for the other ownership classes, shows some improvement from 0.77 percent in 2001-03 to 1.14 percent in 2004-05 (Table 3b) . Table 3c reports the leverage ratio, deªned as the ratio of total debts over total liabilities. The sample average suggests that leverage increases only slightly from 59.46 in 2001-03 to 59.93 percent in 2004-05 and averaged 59.65 percent over the entire period, which is a relatively high value by international standards. In addition, lever- 
Note: ROA is calculated as the ratio of the sum of proªts within the class to the sum of total assets within the class.
age is systematically higher for SOEs and has increased over the years. Foreignfunded ªrms have the lowest leverage at 52.59 percent, followed by the Hong KongMacau-Taiwan companies at 55.13 percent, private ªrms at 60.25, cooperative enterprises at 60.86 percent, and SOEs at 68.49 percent.
Obviously, the low costs of debt for SOEs might be explained by other factors. For instance, a major expected difference between the SOEs and private enterprises is asset size, whereby creditors might grant lower borrowing rates to SOEs because their large asset size can be utilized for collateral and makes them less likely to default. Indeed, asset size differs noticeably across ownership classes (Table 4a) . Typically, SOEs are more than twice as large as foreign-owned ªrms, almost four times as large as enterprises receiving capital from Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan, and more than ten times as large as cooperatives or private ªrms.
The employment number may be another indicator. As shown in Indeed, the data conªrm that the costs of debt are noticeably lower as ªrm size increases. Table 4c reports the interest rates according to our two deªnitions. The drop in the costs of debt is particularly visible as ªrm size moves beyond 85 employees, which is the median value in the sample.
Another consideration is the industrial sector. SOEs are traditionally concentrated in sectors that may require economies of scale as a natural monopoly. Specialization in these sectors might also induce lenders to perceive lower probabilities of default for SOEs. Indeed, as shown in Table 5 , the degree of over-representation of SOEs is largest in tap water production and supply and in electric power, steam, and hot water. These two sectors comprise approximately one-third of the total SOEs in our sample and it is worth noticing that the cost of debt in these two sectors-2.76 and 2.94 percent, respectively-is far below the average (3.88 percent).
Finally, the costs of debt may also vary across provinces where, at times, the level of economic development is low, the degree of privatization is small, the industrial Taiwan  Foreign capital  Total   2001  473  149  117  296  266  217  2002  476  143  118  303  264  216  2003  477  146  115  319  267  213  2004  321  -105  288  260  179  2005  495  86  113  314  296  207 Memorandum items: structure is highly concentrated in heavy or resource-oriented industries, and foreign presence is minimal. As shown in Table 6 , SOEs are at least twice as represented with respect to the overall sample in 17 provinces, in decreasing order: Xizang, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jilin, Shanxi, Beijing City, Yunnan, Jiangxi, Tianjin, Liaoning, Hunan, and Nei Mongol, mostly in the western and northeastern heavy industry hinterland. It is important to highlight that in 13 of these 17 provinces the average cost of debt is below-often much below-the national average.
Although these simple statistical analyses may be revealing, an econometric framework is still required to show whether this is indeed the case empirically. Speciªcally, we need to control for proªtability, asset size, ªrm size, industrial sector, and the location of each enterprise. We turn to the empirical framework in the following sub-section.
Econometric results
In line with the previous discussion, the regressions we estimate have the following form:
where the dependent variable y it will alternatively be intrate it or intrate1 it ; SOE, COOP, HKMTW, and FORK are dummies taking value 1, respectively, for SOEs, cooperatives, companies owned from Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan, and enterprises with ownership outside of greater China, and taking value 0 otherwise. Here the omitted variable is PRIV, which is the dummy for private enterprises. SECTOR is a Table 7 shows the results for intrate, and conªrms our expectations. Larger enterprises have lower costs of debt. In addition, with respect to ownership, even after controlling for size, location, and productive specialization, SOEs, Hong KongMacau-Taiwan ªrms, and foreign-owned companies still pay lower loan rates compared to private companies (i.e., the omitted ownership dummy), and no signiªcant difference is detected for the cooperatives. To be sure, the debt costs gap compared to private enterprises is largest for SOEs, intermediate for foreign-owned companies, and lowest for Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan ªrms. The cost of debt for SOEs is lower than for otherwise equivalent private companies by 221 basis points over the entire period. While this gap decreases somewhat (54 basis points) between the ªrst sub-period 2001-03 and the second sub-period 2004-05, it still runs at 188 basis points in the later sub-period. Thus, the distortion coming from the credit market is certainly not trivial.
The results for intrate1 are also consistent with our a priori (see abridged results in Table 8 ). Firm size implies lower interest rates while SOEs, Hong Kong-Macau- If, instead of imputing private enterprise interest rates, we charge SOEs the interest rates estimated for foreign capital enterprises, the drop in SOE proªts is still huge. Over the entire 2001-05 period, the drop amounts to 57.7 and 112.5 percent according to the intpay and ªnco methods, respectively.
Conclusion
This paper investigated whether the proªts of SOEs in China are real using a data set that is representative of corporate China (i.e., the Ϯ250,000 ªrms with annual sales over 50 million yuan) for the period 2001 to 2005 by China's NBS. Our empirical ªndings suggest that SOE proªts might be overstated because SOEs have historically beneªted from subsidized bank credit. Owing to political interference inducing state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) to lend to them, SOEs were hardly disciplined by lenders. Although SOE losses were the major source of SOCB NPLs, it is common knowledge that even those SOEs repaying their loans do so on favorable terms. Thus, subsided loans to SOEs contribute to a large extent to maintaining SOCBs' poor proªtability track record and, through that, cause repeated capital injections in the SOCBs by the government.
Within our framework, the paper made three contributions. First, we constructed a representative sample of corporate China where SOEs are oversampled purposely to allow more precise identiªcation of their peculiarities compared to other Chinese enterprises. Second, using that sample, we proved that, indeed, the cost of debt is signiªcantly lower for SOEs, even after controlling for individual ªrm features. Third, we estimated that should SOEs pay the same loan rates as otherwise equivalent private enterprises, their additional interest outlays would be larger than SOE proªts on average from 2001-05 and-even though decreasing relatively-the additional interest payment would still wipe out all SOE proªts from 2004-05, the most recent years in our sample. And even charging SOEs the same interest rates esti- mated for foreign capital enterprises-thus making the hardly tenable assumption that the ability/willingness to honor debt obligations is the same for the two classes of companies-the SOE proªts would at least halve if not vanish.
Accordingly, it seems that safeguarding creditors' rights should be the utmost priority. This means inducing SOEs to pay market interest rates on (and to service scrupulously) their loans. Through that, SOCB performance would improve greatly-in a way consistent with the new incentives after the stock exchange listing of three of the four SOCBs-and the state would save further recapitalization. In addition, in this case, SOE managers would undergo creditors' discipline, to which the discipline exerted by dividends could be added should proªts still remain positive after adequate loan servicing.
Overall, our results suggest that strengthening creditors' rights should be the primary step in the process to complete transition to a market economy in China by bringing SOEs under more strict discipline. Dividend policy should come second and not ªrst. 
Memorandum items:
Total number of enterprises 5,000 7,500 6,814 7,165 7,790 5,597 9,276 Source: Authors' calculations based on our own database.
